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Abstract
A definition of a Realistic Physics Theory is proposed based on the idea
that, at all time, the set of physical properties possessed (at that time) by
a system should unequivocally determine the probabilities of outcomes of
all possible measurements.
1 Introduction
Some of the physics literature of the last two decades abundantly mentions
realistic theories, especially when discussing quantum physics, nonlocality and
Bell inequalities (see e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4]), or epistemic versus ontic interpretations
of the quantum state [5, 6]. On the one side, this is highly interesting as most
physicists have some intuitive understanding of what ”reality” is. However,
on the other side, it is very disappointing, because the vast majority of this
literature doesn’t properly define realistic theories and thus obscures what could
be an interesting debate [7].
The aim of this note is to propose a plausible definition of a realistic theory,
section 2. It is not entirely new, but seems to have been forgotten. A good
definition should be testable, however, the definition I propose is not testable
in one single experiment. Nonetheless it defines whether a given physics theory
is realistic or not. Hence, testing our best realistic physics theories amounts
to testing whether we can maintain a realistic physical description of nature.
Section 3 discusses nonlocality in the context of our definition.
2 Definition of Realistic Physics Theories
In the physics literature one finds essentially two characterizations of realistic
theories:
1. All measurement outcomes are determined by the state of the physical
system. In other words, at any time all physical quantities have their
value somehow written in the physical system (these may change as time
passes).
2. All measurement outcome probabilities are determined by the state of the
physical system. In other words, at any time all physical quantities have
the probabilities of all their possible values written in the physical system
(again, these may change as time passes).
Note that both characterizations incorporate the idea that measurement
outcomes (or their probabilities) are defined prior and independently of the ob-
server, as one would expect for a realistic theory. Nevertheless, both character-
izations are unsatisfactory. The first one identifies realistic with deterministic.
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Indeed, if measurement outcomes are written in the system, then, either ran-
domness can only be due to our ignorance of the precise state of the system,
i.e. randomness is not intrinsic but merely epistemic, or randomness is merely
due to non-perfect measurements, i.e. randomness is technical as in classical
physics. The second characterization is not better, as one can hardly see how
a theory could not satisfy it, i.e. how the state of a physical system could not
determine the probabilities of all measurement outcomes. Indeed, such ”states”
would make no prediction at all, they would not even predict the frequencies of
measurement outcomes1. In brief, no physicist would call such ”states”, states
of physical systems.
Consequently, the first characterization is too strong, as it imposes deter-
minism, while the second characterization is too weak, as all scientific theories
have to satisfy it. However, intuitively, both characterizations contain some
truth. The state of physical system must determine the probabilities of all pos-
sible measurement outcomes, as suggested by the second characterization. And
at least some physical properties2 must be written in the physical system, as
suggested by the first characterization (if not how would one even recognize the
system?). This leads to the following definition:
Definition 1: A theory is realistic if and only if, according to the mathe-
matical structure of this theory, the collection of all physical quantities written
in the system unambiguously determines the probabilities of all possible mea-
surement outcomes.
In other words, the theory is such that, at all times, the collection of all prop-
erties possessed3 by the system fully determines all relevant probabilities: the
collection of physical quantities without uncertainty (or, more precisely, with-
out indeterminacy) determines the probabilities of all undetermined physical
quantities. Notice that a possessed property is nothing but what EPR called an
element of reality [8].
This definition captures both the idea that, at any time, some properties
(physical quantities) are written in the system, as suggested by characterization
number 1, and that what is written in the system determines all the relevant
probabilities, as suggested by characterization number 2. When time passes,
some properties possessed by the system pass away, while the system acquires
new properties, i.e. the state of the system evolves.
Let us present our definition more rigorously (see also [9]). Our definition
assumes that physics theories have some concept of physical properties, here
denoted π, and of probability measures, ω : π → ω(π) ∈ [0..1]. Furthermore, it
is the theory that says which sets of properties {πj} can be measured jointly in
a single measurement (whose outcomes corresponding to the - thus compatible
- πj). Probability measures must satisfy the following two natural conditions:
1. If, according to the theory, a given measurement has several possibly mu-
tually exclusive outcomes πj , then, grouping several outcomes together
4,
denoted Π ≡ {πj}, one has ω(Π) =
∑
j ω(πj).
2. If, for any measurement, one groups together all possible outcomes, then
ω(1 ) = 1, where 1 denotes the property corresponding to grouping to-
gether all outcomes.
1This is true whatever interpretation of probabilities one uses; indeed, whatever probabil-
ities are, at the end of the day, probabilities are tested by comparing them with frequencies
in long series of measurements.
2We distinguish physical quantities, like e.g. energy, and physical properties, like e.g. an
energy eigenprojector. When testing a property the answer is binary, yes/no. A physical
quantity corresponds to an entire set of compatible properties. In classical physics proper-
ties are represented by subsets of the phase-space, while in quantum theory properties are
represented by projectors.
3In this note I use equivalently the following terminologies: possessed property, actual
property, property written in the system.
4The outcome Π corresponds to “one of the pij happened”.
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A physics theory must also have some concept of states, here denoted φ. Clearly,
every state φ should determine a unique probability distribution ωφ. However,
one should not identify states with probability measures. Indeed, if only the
probabilities qj of possible states φj ’s are known, then the probability measure
reads
∑
j qjωφj . Hence, not all probability measures correspond to a (pure)
state.
If ωφ(π) = 1, then, when the system is in state φ, the outcome π is written
in the physical system (here, a unit probability is identified with certainty).
We can now present our definition mathematically. A theory is realistic iff,
according to the mathematical structure5 of this theory, the following condition
holds for all (pure) states φ and all probability measures ω:
If {π|ω(π) = 1} = {π|ωφ(π) = 1}, then ω = ωφ.
Hence, in realistic theories the state of a physical system can be identified
with the collection of possessed properties. Indeed, this collection determines
unequivocally all relevant probabilities.
This definition is in accordance with the idea that the state of a physical
system is the collection of all ”actual properties”, i.e. of all physical quanti-
ties such that if one measures them, the outcome is certain or predetermined
[10, 11]. Accordingly, for any deterministic theory the state is merely a sum-
mary of all possible measurement results, as in classical mechanics and in some
interpretations of quantum mechanics like Everett [12] and Bohm6 [15]. For
non-deterministic theories, the situation is more interesting [9]. For example,
according to quantum theory, at any time t, there are physical quantities, rep-
resented in this theory by self-adjoint operators Aj , with well determined values
aj : AjΨt = ajΨt, where Ψt represents the quantum state at time t. Properties
are represented by projectors, e.g. the eigenprojectors πaj of the operators Aj
with spectral decompositions Aj =
∑
aj
aj · π
a
j .
Noteworthy, for any (normalized) pure state Ψt, the collection of all proper-
ties possessed by the system, {πaj |AjΨt = ajΨt}, determines a unique probabil-
ity distribution ωΨt such that ωΨt(π
a
j ) = 1 for all outcomes π
a
j corresponding to
a possessed property. This is nothing but Gleason’s theorem (valid in all Hilbert
spaces of dimension ≥ 3 [16]). As is well-known, this probability distribution
reads ωΨt(π
a
j ) = 〈Ψt |π
a
j |Ψt〉.
According to Definition 1 both classical and quantum theories are realistic.
Note that, in both theories, mixed states do not satisfy the proposed definition.
This should be no surprise, as mixed states describe situations involving some
ignorance, either about the precise state preparation or about a part of the
global system which has been ignored (traced out, as physicists say).
The case of 2-dimensional quantum systems, so-called qubits, is interesting.
Pure states can be labeled by vectors pointing on the unit sphere in ordinary
3-dimensional space, φ = |~m〉, and all nontrivial properties, (i.e. not equal to
the identity 1 ) can also be labeled by vectors on the unit sphere π~p = |~p〉〈 ~p |.
Compatible (nontrivial) properties correspond to antipodal points on the sphere.
According to quantum theory, every state |~m〉 is associated to the following
probability measure: ω~m(π~p) = 〈 ~m |π~p|~m〉 =
1+~m·~p
2 . Accordingly, for every
state |~m〉 there is a unique (nontrivial) actual property π~m that corresponds to
the same point on the sphere. However, since Gleason’s theorem doesn’t hold in
dimension two, there are different probability measures with precisely the same
5More precisely, the mathematical structure of the set of all properties, according to this
theory.
6Notice that in Bohm’s theory two apparata corresponding to the same self-adjoint operator
and identical initial state-vector, but with different hidden positions of the particles making
up the apparata may lead to different measurement outcomes (this is true even for position
measurements [13]). Accordingly, in Bohm’s theory there are many more properties than in
quantum theory [14]. Consequently, the set of possessed properties in Bohm’s theory defines
not only the state-vector of the system, but also its hidden positions.
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set of actual properties. For example, the probability measure7 ω(π~p) =
1+(~m·~p)3
2
takes the value one on precisely the same set of properties as ω~m, but clearly
differs from ω~m. Such an example is impossible for qutrits and all quantum
systems described by Hilbert spaces of dimensions larger or equal to 3.
Consequently, quantum theory limited to one qubit is an example of a non-
realistic theory. But, clearly, qubits don’t exist per se, in some disembodied
form, but only as subsystems of larger - actually infinite dimensional - systems;
hence this is a nice example, but not a compelling one against fundamental
theories being realistic.
Let me conclude this section by admitting that I would be greatly surprised,
even shocked, if any future fundamental theory in physics would be non-realistic
according to the proposed definition8. But logically this is certainly possible.
3 Nonlocality
In the context of quantum nonlocality, some physicists conclude that no theory
compatible with the violation of Bell inequalities can be realistic. As long as
the word ”realistic” is not defined, one can’t argue against (nor in favor) of
such a statement [17]. According to Definition 1, such a statement is clearly
wrong, as quantum theory predicts the violation of some Bell inequalities and
is realistic. However, in order for a realistic theory to predict the violation of
some Bell inequalities, the theory must incorporate some form of nonlocality.
Definition 1 of a realistic theory rests on the concept of possessed properties, or
equivalently of physical quantities without indeterminacy. Thus, if the system is
delocalized, like a delocalized photon in two (or more) optical modes or like two
(or more) entangled particles located at a distance from each other, then some
of the physical quantities without indeterminacy are also delocalized. Note that
in order to measure such delocalized physical quantities the measurement appa-
ratus itself must be delocalized or must consist of several parts. It is certainly
highly counter-intuitive that some properties written (at some point in time)
in a physical system can be delocalized, but that doesn’t make them less real.
For example, if two systems have their spin 12 entangled as in the singlet state,
then their global spin is zero although this global spin is delocalized; one way
to measure it uses an apparatus with two pieces, one near each particle, each
measuring the spin 12 along the same direction; the pre-determined outcome is
that the two local results are opposite. In this example, the possessed property
global spin zero is written in the 2-particle system, hence it is written out there
in space, but in a nonlocal fashion.
4 Conclusion
I proposed a possibly definition of realistic theories which avoids the mere reduc-
tion to determinism and avoids the risk of tautology. This definition is closely
related to the concept of state as the collection of all actual properties, or equiv-
alently as the collection of all elements of reality. According to it, both classical
and quantum theories are realistic. Consequently, one can’t avoid nonlocality
7Note that ω(pi~p) + ω(pi−~p) = ω(1 ) = 1, as it should.
8For me, realism is merely the existence of a world outside me and independent of me. A
priori, this world could be described as well by classical physics as by quantum theory or by
any future theory. Indeed, the existence of an outside world doesn’t impose any restriction
on how this world is (the main and only point is that it exists). This outside world could
be deterministic or random, local or nonlocal, entirely within space-time or not, fully under-
standable by our intelligence or not. Hence, physics will never be able to deny its existence.
However, let me confess an act of faith: I believe that by studying physics I open a small
skylight on this external world. What I can see is only a tiny part of it, but already this tiny
part is absolutely fascinating: enlarging this small window is the great Enterprise of Science.
And let me add that if one assumes realism, then it is all the most natural to look for realistic
theories and to be satisfied only by realistic theories.
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by merely rejecting realistic theories. Still, non-realistic theories exist mathe-
matically and one may wonder whether any future fundamental physics theory
may be non-realistic.
Other definitions of realistic physics theories are possible [18]. It is an in-
teresting research program to compare them and to investigate the status of
Bell-nonlocality in each of them.
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